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Abstract
Background: Models of between-farm transmission of pathogens have identified service vehicles and social groups as risk
factors mediating the spread of infection. Because of high levels of economic organization in much of the poultry industry,
we examined the importance of company affiliation, as distinct from social contacts, in a model of the potential spread of
avian influenza among broiler poultry farms in a poultry-dense region in the United States. The contribution of company
affiliation to risk of between-farm disease transmission has not been previously studied.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We obtained data on the nature and frequency of business and social contacts through a
national survey of broiler poultry growers in the United States. Daily rates of contact were estimated using Monte Carlo
analysis. Stochastic modeling techniques were used to estimate the exposure risk posed by a single infectious farm to other
farms in the region and relative risk of exposure for farms under different scenarios. The mean daily rate of vehicular contact
was 0.82 vehicles/day. The magnitude of exposure risk ranged from ,1% to 25% under varying parameters. Risk of
between-farm transmission was largely driven by company affiliation, with farms in the same company group as the index
farm facing as much as a 5-fold increase in risk compared to farms contracted with different companies. Employment of
part-time workers contributed to significant increases in risk in most scenarios, notably for farms who hired day-laborers.
Social visits were significantly less important in determining risk.
Conclusions/Significance: Biosecurity interventions should be based on information on industry structure and company
affiliation, and include part-time workers as potentially unrecognized sources of viral transmission. Modeling efforts to
understand pathogen transmission in the context of industrial food animal production should consider company affiliation
in addition to geospatial factors and pathogen characteristics. Restriction of social contacts among farmers may be less
useful in reducing between-farm transmission.
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Introduction
The recent H1N1 pandemic draws attention to the role the
organization of food animal production industries may play in the
generation and transmission of novel influenza A viruses [1–3].
While avian influenza (AI) prevention efforts have largely focused
on improving biosecurity in small-holder poultry systems in recent
years, influenza risk factors associated with industrial poultry or
swine production warrant increased scrutiny [4]. In nations where
the poultry industry is highly industrialized and integrated by
producer, such as the United States and increasingly in Asia and
Latin America, the burden and transmission of infection within
and among commercial flocks may serve as an important
mechanism of minimizing or preventing viral adaptation and
transmission to humans [5].
More than 9 billion broiler chickens (raised for meat and
slaughtered at 6–7 weeks) were produced in the US in 2007 [6].
Industrially produced poultry are raised in confined housing,
provided with defined feeds rather than access to forage, and
managed in order to facilitate the uniform and reliable production
of meat products [7]. The industry is highly vertically integrated,
with poultry production companies (known as integrators)
contracting with farmers (referred to as growers) to raise the birds
prior to slaughter [8]. Production is highly geographically
centralized in the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic regions of the
country (Figure 1).
The absence of H5N1 in the US to date does not in and of itself
indicate that biosecurity measures in the US poultry industry have
been effective. Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses of
great antigenic diversity are detected frequently in commercial
poultry in the US, with over 100 detections confirmed by viral
isolation in commercial and small-scale flocks from 2004–2008 [9].
From 2002–2005, hemagglutinin subtypes H1-H13 and all nine
neuraminidase subtypes were recovered from US poultry flocks.
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of high pathogenic potential for poultry) in US commercial broiler
and turkey flocks is estimated at .0015%, yet prevalence of non-
reportable LPAI is clearly substantially higher [10].
LPAI viruses are often considered to be of lower risk because
they are associated with limited mortality in poultry, but they may
be harbingers of risk to humans since pathogenicity to poultry is
not a precondition for human infection. Moreover, their
circulation in poultry flocks provides a setting for viral evolution
and human exposure.
Recent LPAI outbreaks with sustained farm-farm transmission
in the US demonstrate the challenges in successfully containing AI
viruses in the commercial poultry industry. A LPAI H7N2 virus
infected 47 broiler flocks in Pennsylvania from 1996–1998 and
seven flocks in 2001 and 2002, resulting in the culling of three
million birds and losses exceeding $4 million [11,12]. In 2002,
LPAI H7N2 appeared in Virginia, spreading to 197 turkey and
broiler farms and resulting in the depopulation of 4.7 million birds
[13], and resurfaced in live markets and broiler facilities in the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic again in 2004. An LPAI H5N2 virus
resulted in culling over 75,000 turkeys in the Shenandoah Valley
in 2007; detections of LPAI H7N9 and LPAI H7N3 led to the
culling of 116,000 turkeys and broiler breeders in Nebraska and
Arkansas that same year. In March 2009, 20,000 broiler breeders
were culled following a detection of an LPAI H7 virus in Kentucky
[14].
LPAI detections in the US highlight the difficulty in preventing
viral incursions in commercial poultry operations, yet likely
represent a minority of the total burden of LPAI in the US. Little
to no information is released to the public regarding non-H5 and
non-H7 LPAI detections. Additionally, data on the poultry
industry are typically not collected by state or federal agencies,
and existing information is often not publically accessible. Only
since 2006, when detections of low pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses
became reportable to the OIE, have county-level identifiers been
released to the public following a detection of LPAI in the US. At
present, for non-H5 and non-H7 viruses, an infected farm is
publically identified by state only; no information on specific
location or company affiliation is typically released.
A growing literature supports the role of vehicular transmission
and social groups as important viral conduits among farms. Two
analyses of the 2002 outbreak in Virginia identified worker
movement and between-farm vehicular transportation as risk
factors for between–farm transmission at that time [15,16]. In an
Figure 1. Number of broilers and other meat-type chickens sold in the United States, 2007 (Source: USDA Census of Agriculture,
2007).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.g001
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in 2003, Thomas et al. (2005) identified shared human resources
and equipment as significant factors in international transmission
of the virus [17]. Analyses of outbreaks of other zoonoses, such as
foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever, have also found
that vehicular transmission between farms is an important factor
for pathogen movement [18,19]. However, no previous study has
considered the organization of industrial food animal production
in terms of producer groups and the contribution of these groups
to between-farm contact and exposure risk.
Our research aims to approximate the nature and frequency of
contact patterns among poultry farms in the US through national
sampling and modeling to estimate AI exposure risk in a region of
high poultry density, focusing on the business dynamics specific to
industrial poultry production. Quantitative modeling is useful both
as a means of understanding the causes of an outbreak and to
forecast risk in currently unaffected areas, and has been widely
applied in the zoonotic influenza control literature [20–25]. The
ability to use modeling to understand risk factors and control
points in the US poultry industry is hampered by the lack of
readily available information on rates of contact between farms.
Efforts to understand viral transmission in advance of an outbreak
remain critically important for AI prevention in the US.
Methods
Ethics statement
This research was conducted with the approval of the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review
Board.
Poultry grower survey
We developed and conducted an online survey of contract
broiler growers in the US (available from the authors by request).
The questions were designed in collaboration with a small group of
growers in the Delmarva region who have worked with our
research group on previous projects and pilot tested with this
group. Our study population was a convenience sample of broiler
growers who responded to an email invitation to participate in an
online survey. Invitations to participate in the survey were sent to
contacts and colleagues in the broiler industry, who forwarded the
survey link to personal and business email lists of broiler growers.
The survey was posted on the ‘‘SurveyMonkey’’ server, and
responses were anonymous [26]. Questions were multiple choice
or short answer in format. The site remained active for three
months, from February 2008 to April 2008.
The survey queried growers about farm size and business cycle
(number of houses, number of birds per house, total bird capacity,
frequency and duration of between-flock gap periods), household
size, poultry industry and service visitors to and from the farm,
frequency of these visits, and biosecurity and waste management
practices on the farm. Growers were asked to report how often a
service vehicle affiliated with a given service visited the farm per
week, per growing cycle (6–7 weeks) or per year, with the time
period depending on prior knowledge of these variables. These
time periods were chosen so as to maximize the usefulness of the
information collected and incorporate data from farms that might
be without a flock at the time of our survey.
We also asked growers if they employed workers (non-
household members) to work in the poultry houses. If growers
reported hiring workers, we queried the number of workers, full-
time or part-time status, days per week worked during the growing
season, and whether these workers worked at other poultry farms
in addition to their own. Questions were also asked about
frequency of social visits (family and friends), and the approximate
percentage of these visitors who were also poultry growers as a way
to estimate social contact between growers.
Data analysis
For this study, we defined ‘‘integrator-linked contact’’ as a visit
to the farm from a service vehicle or personnel affiliated with the
poultry company to which the farm is contracted. ‘‘Non-integrator
commercial contacts’’ refer to service visits from companies that
are unaffiliated with a single integrator but rather service farms
regardless of company affiliation. ‘‘Exposure’’ is defined as a visit
to a susceptible farm from a vehicle that had also visited the index
farm during the period of infectiousness and during the time when
the virus was assumed to survive on that vehicle. To note: we focus
on primary exposures from the index case in this study, rather
than dynamics of viral spread once multiple farms are infected, in
order to highlight upstream control points and depict the
magnitude of potential exposure risk stemming from a single
infectious farm.
The raw data on frequency of visits to the farm was transferred
to STATA [27], and transformed into daily contact rates to permit
comparisons across different vehicle sources. Daily contact rates
were calculated for the following business contacts: feed delivery,
flock supervisor visits (an integrator employee who is the main
point of contact between the integrator and the grower), visits from
other management personnel, chick delivery, live haul (removal of
chickens at the end of the growing cycle for slaughter), meter
readings, propane delivery, maintenance visits, cake out (removal
of poultry wastes from the poultry houses) and waste haul (removal
of poultry wastes from the property).
Daily contact rates were also calculated for social visits among
broiler growers. Non-grower social contacts were assumed to pose
less of a risk of avian influenza transmission between farms and
therefore we only considered social contact among growers in our
analysis.
Since a minority of respondents reported hiring part-time
workers (12.5%), we estimated risk separately for farms employed
part-time workers and did not include daily rates of contact with
part-time workers as a risk factor for the majority of farms that did
not engage in this practice. The model assumed that workers who
worked only at a single poultry farm would be unlikely to expose
that farm to AI from a second farm, but that workers who worked
at multiple farms could transmit the virus between the farms of
their employment.
The daily contact rate from part-time non-household poultry
house workers was assessed using two scenarios that were intended
to represent the range of likely employment practices. These
scenarios were drawn from our survey data and confirmed by
phone conversations and in-person interviews with Delmarva
growers as appropriate for that region. The first scenario assumed
uniform random mixing of part-time workers within a subset of
farms who hired these workers and assumed each farm hired one
worker per day. A function developed and run in the ‘R’ statistical
platform [28] was used to estimate the number of distinct farms
exposed by workers having visited the index farm under the
assumption of random mixing during a given period. A second
part-time worker scenario approximated an intermittent employ-
ment structure. Workers in this scenario worked at two distinct
farms on alternating days, and each farm employed a single
worker for 3 days per week.
Spearman rank correlation in STATA was used to determine
correlation between continuous contact frequency data and
between basic farm descriptors (number of houses, number of
birds per house, and total bird capacity). This nonparametric
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evidence that our data were not normally distributed.
Monte Carlo simulations
Daily contact rate data were transferred from STATA to an
Excel spreadsheet [29]. Nonparametric bootstrapping (Monte
Carlo analysis) using the Crystal Ball software package [30] was
conducted for each source of contact because the data did not
convincingly suggest specific parametric distributions. 10,000
simulations were conducted for daily contact rates by source, as
this number of simulations was determined to be sufficient to
achieve stable results. From simulation results, descriptive statistics
(mean, median, standard deviation, coefficient of variation) were
generated for each source of contact. Hypothesis tests and
confidence intervals for estimates of contact rates, exposure risks
and exposure risk differences were also constructed using
nonparametric bootstrap resampling implemented in Crystal Ball.
Based on information from our grower collaborators, we
considered chick delivery, live haul, feed delivery, flock supervisor
visits and visits from other management personnel to circulate
within the integrator group only (integrator-linked contacts). Non-
integrator commercial services related to cake out, waste hauling,
propane delivery and meter reading were assumed to contact
farms contracted with multiple integrators and be regional, rather
than company-specific, in nature. Part-time workers and grower
social visits were also not limited by integrator group, under the
assumption that they moved in the region unrestricted by
integrator affiliation.
Sussex County, Delaware was used as the geographical
framework for this analysis. Sussex County has been the top
broiler producing county in the US since 1944, with production
exceeding 211 million broilers in 2007 [6]. The county is situated
within the Delmarva Peninsula (a region of Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia), which despite its small size (180660 miles),
produced more than 7% of total US broiler chicken production
in 2007 [6]. Poultry production is densely clustered along the
midline of the peninsula, and this area is ringed by four major
wildlife preserves which are visited by millions of wild birds
annually on the Western Atlantic flyway, posing opportunities for
cross-species transmission [31]. LPAI was most recently detected
in commercial poultry in Delmarva in 2004, when an LPAI H7N2
virus spread to at least three broiler farms (2 being commercial
farms) before it was contained, resulting in the depopulation of
over 100,000 broilers [9].
Data on the number of poultry farms in Sussex County were
collected from the 2007 USDA Census of Agriculture [6] and from
Google Earth maps [32]. For the Google Earth mapping, a grid
was superimposed over a satellite image of the county and facilities
that appeared to be poultry houses were identified by a marker,
starting from a height of 38,000 feet. Three methods were used to
confirm the presence and location of poultry houses: 1) a second
pass through the county following major roads surrounding
processing plants; 2) a third visual assessment of the grids at lower
altitudes; and 3) observation and measurement of each individual
farm at a lower altitude. The closer observation was intended to
confirm that the object was a poultry house, identify the number of
houses on the property and classify poultry houses by size (small or
large). Small houses were ,90 m in length and large houses were
.90 m. The ruler function in Google Earth was used to measure
the houses. Houses that were co-located or situated along the same
driveway were considered part of a single farm.
Through Google Earth, 789 farms were identified by location
and size in Sussex County, which is higher than the USDA Census
estimate of 714 farms. As a result of this discrepancy, we chose an
intermediate number–750 farms–as an estimate of the number of
farms in the county for use in this model. Median farm size
observed from our Google Earth mapping was 2 large houses, and
53% of farms had 1 or 2 large houses. 54 farms had ten or more
big houses on a single property. 10% of farms had small houses
only. Given a lack of consistent data on the correlation between
farm size and rate of visits, however, we did not incorporate the
information on farm size into our model and assumed all farms
had the same rate of contact, regardless of size.
From information provided from the Delmarva Poultry
Industry, Inc.[33], the regional trade organization, we assumed
that there are three major integrators operating in Sussex County.
We set the same number of farms to each integrator, assuming that
250 farms in the county were contracted to each integrator. There
are more farms in Sussex County than other counties in the
Delmarva Peninsula, but the three integrators that operate here
also operate in many of the other areas in Delmarva [33].
We estimated the number of farms a single service vehicle could
service in a single workday through conversations with Delmarva
growers and, for non-integrator commercial operations, an
assessment of the number of such firms in the region. These
values were used to guide Monte Carlo simulations on these
estimates, with triangular distributions fitted to these data to
incorporate the minimum, maximum, and mode of our data.
Spatial factors and locational data of farms were not explicitly
included in this model, which focused principally on company
groups and business services. Our use of a range of farms that a
given service vehicle could visit in a day implies a similar, but not
exact, spatial distribution of farms within integrator groups, which
does integrate spatial information a very limited way into our
model. It is possible that farms associated with the same integrator
are also clustered spatially, but this data was not included in our
model here, which focused solely on the role of vehicular contact.
The generalizability of our contact rate data to the Delmarva
region was confirmed in three ways: 1) in-person and phone
conversations with Delmarva broiler growers, who reported the
duration of time different service vehicles spent on the farm; 2) an
analysis of truck traffic density data for Sussex County, using
publically available documents from the Delaware Department of
Transportation [34]; and 3) on the ground observations of truck
movements in the region by the authors and our collaborators [35].
Exposure risk estimation
Our model assumes that a single farm, contained within a single
integrator group in Sussex County, becomes infected by and
subsequently infectious with an AI virus. We used stochastic
techniques to estimate the risk that a second farm in the region
would be exposed to the virus from the infectious (index) farm
during a period of infectiousness, which was calculated at a range
of days (2, 5, 10, and 15 days). These time points were chosen to
encompass the biological parameters of duration of infectiousness
in experimental settings [36–41] as well as time to farmer detection
and reporting of the outbreak, which may take up to 2 weeks,
according to study of the 2003 HPAI outbreak in the Netherlands
[42].
Data on the survival of avian influenza viruses on fomites was
used to estimate the ability of a vehicle to expose secondary farm.
Studies of influenza A viruses in hospital or other social settings
suggest that the virus may survival on surfaces up to 2 days, with
survival duration depending on surface type and temperature [43–
45]. Research in the farm environment has observed longer
survival times, up to 7 days in manure and on other farm surfaces,
such as tires, feathers and plastic [46,47]. We developed two
scenarios–one assuming 2 days and one assuming 7 days of viral
Between Farm Influenza Spread
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | e9888survival on a vehicle – to incorporate a reasonable range of
survival times in our model.
Because this model is focused on exposure risk rather than
infection risk, we made the simplifying assumption that the index
farm had a constant level of infectiousness during its period of
infectiousness, rather than assuming infectiousness followed a
standard epidemic curve. This assumption added parsimony to
our model and allowed for straightforward comparison of sources
of risk in different scenarios.
The period-specific probability of exposure, Pn(d), was calculat-
ed as the risk of any given second farm in the county being
contacted by a vehicle that had 1) serviced the index farm during
the period of the index farm’s n infectious days; 2) serviced the
index farm before the second farm; and 3) serviced the second
farm within the period during which the virus could survive on the
vehicle (s). These probabilities were calculated for farms within
(d=1) and outside (d=0) the integrator group. All calculations
were performed in Excel.
Information on the derivation of the equation is provided in the
Supplemental Information (Figure S1) available with this article.
The probability of exposure by day n due to any source can be
estimated by Equation 1 below, which is one minus the product of
three probabilities, representing cyclical events related to integra-
tor-linked and commercial service contacts, contacts with part-
time workers, and social contact among growers.
The probability of exposure due to any source can be estimated
by:
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where n is the days of infectiousness at the index farm, s is the days
of viral survival on a service vehicle, d is a binary variable indicating
whetherthepotentiallyexposedfarmis inthe sameintegratorgroup
as the index farm, Ni is the average number of farms visited daily by
vehicles in the i
th vehicular group, Mi is the number of farms
serviced by a given service vehicle during the total duration of the
service cycle, ti is the average cycle length for the i
th vehicular
group, Nin is the average number of farms within integrator groups,
N is the total number of farms in the region, ni is a binary variable
indicating whether vehicles in the i
th vehicular group only operate
within integrator groups, ^ m m a,b,c ðÞ is the estimated mean number of
distinct farms (excluding the index farm) exposed due to part-time
workers when a total of a farms are participating in worker
exchanges, and with periods of farm and vehicle infectiousness of b
and c days, respectively, r12 is the average daily number of social
grower-visitors at a given visitor-receiving farm, and M12 is the
average number of visitor-receiving farms on any given day.
Results
Seventeen broiler growers completed our online survey (n=17).
Characteristics of survey respondents are presented in Table 1.
Respondents represented basic demographics of the broiler industry
in terms of size of farms and poultry houses and regional distribution.
The median number of chickens per house was 23,500, with a
median of 4 houses per farm. Seventy three percent (73%) of
respondents were from Southeast states, with 20% from the mid-
Atlantic region and the remaining 7% from the Midwest and West.
No significant correlations among our daily contact rate
calculations were observed by visit type, lending support to our
assumption that contact rate variables are independent. As a measure
of farm size, total bird capacity at one time on the farm was positively
correlated with flock supervisor visits (p=0.045), as well as with a
composite variable representing all non-integrator commercial visits
(p=0.013) and marginally with feed delivery visits (p=0.069).
Daily contact rates, total and by source, are presented in Table 2.
The mean daily contact rate from all sources was 0.82 vehicular
contacts per day. Integrator sources accounted for approximately
80.5% of total contact, with 15.5% of contacts connected to non-
integrator commercial visits and part-time workers. 4.0% of total
contacts were social visits among growers. According to these
results, a broiler farm in our sample is visited by a contact linked to
the integrator approximately at least once every 1.5 days and by a
contact linked to non-integrator commercial services every 8 days.
Growersinoursurveyreportedasocialcontactwithanothergrower
an average of once per month.
Table 1. Select characteristics of survey respondents*.
Variable Values
Median number of broilers per house 23,500 (range: 15,500–100,000)
Median number of broiler houses on the farm 4 (range: 2–12)
Median total bird capacity 100,800 (range: 33,700–400,000)
Median household size 2 adults
% of respondents reporting:
Hiring non-household workers on the farm 10 farms
Hiring part-time workers
+ 2 farms
Caking out the poultry houses themselves or with help of other growers 14 farms
Doing some or all of poultry house maintenance themselves 14 farms
Full-time or part-time off-farm employment for self or spouse 10 farms
Employment in the poultry industry for 10+ years 10 farms
*n=17 respondents.
+n=16 for this question.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t001
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at each farm once every 2 days during the 6–7 week growing cycle.
The flock supervisor visited each farm on average every 9 days
during the growing cycle. Other management personnel were
reported to visit the farm less frequently, on average 2–3 times
during the year. Contact from chick delivery and live haul vehicles
occurred typically 1–2 times during the growing cycle, with farms
with more chickens reporting dual delivery and pickup cycles.
Propane deliveries and meter readings occurred approximately
monthly (mean every 26 days). Mean frequency for visits from
outside maintenance or repair services was low–approximately 4–
5 times per year–with 82% of farmers reporting doing some or all
repairs themselves (Table 1). Daily contact from cake out and
waste hauling service contributed minimally to the total daily
contact rate, with each service occurring 2–3 times annually and
82% of farmers reporting caking out their poultry houses on their
own and not hiring outside companies for this service.
Contribution to variance
Rate of visits from non-flock supervisor management personnel,
maintenance/repair workers and part-time workers had the
highest coefficient of variation estimates, suggesting greater
variability in the data for these two variables than for other
sources of contact (Table 2). Rates of cake out service visits had the
lowest contribution to variance, followed by flock supervisor, chick
delivery and live haul services.
Exposure risk estimates
The model estimated the risk of exposure for farms within the
same integrator group as the index farm and for farms outside the
same integrator group (that is, contracted to other integrators) but
within Sussex County. Point estimates of risk and 95% confidence
intervals are presented in Table 3 and in bar graph form in
Figure 2a and 2b.
Assuming a 2-day period of viral survival on a vehicle, a second
farm affiliated with the same integrator group as the index farm
would likely face an exposure risk of more than 3% with a 2 day
period of infectiousness at the index farm [mean =3.6 (95% CI:
2.4, 4.9)] (Table 3). This risk may exceed 11% at 15 days of
infectiousness [mean=11.8; (8.3, 16.2)]. Farms outside the
integrator group of the index farm faced minimal risk at 2 days
of infectiousness of the index farm (,1%) and upwards of 4% risk
of exposure by 15 days of infectiousness [mean=4.4 (3.6, 6.0)].
In the scenario assuming 2 days of viral survival on a vehicle,
farms within the same integrator group as the index farm faced
nearly 5-fold increase in risk compared to farms associated with
different integrator groups at 2 days of infectiousness [RR =4.9
(3.1, 6.8)]. At 15 days of infectiousness of the index farm, farms
within the same integrator group had a greater than 2-fold
increase in risk of exposure [RR =2.7 (1.9, 3.8)] (Table 4).
If 7 days of viral survival on a vehicle is assumed (which might
occur as a result of manure on tires, for example [46,47]), farms
within the same integrator group as the index farm may face an
exposure risk greater than 6% at 2 days of infectiousness of the
index farm [mean =6.4 (4.2, 8.6)]. This risk may exceed 25% at
15 days of infectiousness [mean =25.3(18.7, 32.2)]. Farms
affiliated with different integrator groups had minimal risk at 2
days of infectiousness (,2%), with the exposure risk at 15 days of
infectiousness approximately 8% [mean =8.5 (5.5–14.0%)].
In the 7 day viral survival scenario, farms within the integrator
group had an approximately 5-fold increase in risk compared to
Table 2. Daily vehicular contact rates at a broiler farm, by source.
Source of contact
Mean daily rate of contact
(5
th,9 5
th percentile)
*
Approximate mean frequency
of visits (range; max-min)
+
Coefficient
of variation
*
Integrator-linked contacts
Feed delivery 0.48 (0.20, 1.00) 2 days (1–5 days) 0.61
Flock supervisor 0.12 (0.02, 0.16) 9 days (6–45 days) 0.35
Chick delivery 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 35 days (23–45 days) 0.35
Live haul 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 35 days (23–45 days) 0.35
Management personnel other than flock supervisors 0.01 (0.00, 0.04) 142 days (22 days–no visits) 1.94
Total from integrator group 0.66 (0.31, 1.20)
‘ (80.5% of total) 1.5 days (2x daily–3 days) 0.45
Non-integrator commercial visits and part-time
workers
Propane delivery 0.04 (0.02, 0.07) 26 days (15–45 days) 0.39
Meter reading 0.04 (0.02, 0.09) 26 days (11–45 days) 0.70
Maintenance/repair 0.01 (0.00, 0.07) 83 days (23 days- no visits) 1.60
Waste hauling 0.01 (0.00, 0.02) 167 days (65 days–no visits) 0.93
Cake out 0.01 (0.00, 0.01) 180 days (120–360 days) 0.24
Part-time workers 0.03 (0, 0.10) 37 days (1 day–no visits) 1.35
Total, non-integrator commercial visits and
part-time workers
0.13 (0.08, 0.27)
‘ (15.5% of total) 8 days (5–19 days) 0.40
Grower social contacts 0.03 (0.00, 0.10) (4.0% of total) 30 days (10 days–no visits) 0.77
Total daily contact, by all sources 0.82 (0.45, 1.36)
‘ 1.2 days (2x daily–2 days) 0.37
*Values derived from survey data from national survey of poultry growers and Monte Carlo simulations. Confidence intervals generated through nonparametric
bootstrapping resampling in Crystal Ball.
+Based on daily contact rate.
‘Sums calculated from data presented above differ slightly from totals presented due to rounding.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t002
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These farms faced a greater than 3-fold increase in risk at 15-days
of infectiousness (RR=3.1 (2.1, 4.5).
Being within the same integrator group as the index farm was
therefore associated with statistically significant increases in
exposure risk for farms under all model parameters (p,0.05)
(Table 4).
Point estimates of risk varied significantly with the model
parameters of duration of infectiousness at the index farm and
duration of viral survival on a vehicle parameters (p,0.05). In all
scenarios, however, the effect of being within the same integrator
group as the index farm contributed to a greater relative increase
in risk than did changes to the model parameters of duration of
infectiousness at the index farm duration of viral survival on a
vehicle.
Hiring day laborers was associated with statistically significant
increases in exposure risk across all model parameters (p,0.05)
(Table 5). Hiring intermittent workers also contributed to
statistically significant increases in exposure risk for farms that
engaged in this practice across most scenarios, but the increase in
risk associated with this practice was notably less than that
associated with hiring day laborers. In both part-time employment
scenarios, relative risk of exposure was significantly higher for
farms that had a different integrator affiliation than the index farm
compared to farms within the same integrator group as the index
farm (p,0.05). Risk estimates in the part-time worker scenarios
assume that the index farm also engages in the given employment
practice.
A farm outside the integrator group of the index farm that hired
day-laborers faced a greater than 13-fold increase in risk compared
to farms that did not in the 2 day viral survival scenario (Table 5).
In the 7 day viral survival scenario, the farms hiring day laborers
had a 12- to 25-fold increase in risk compared to farms that did
not hire day laborers. Farms within the same integrator group as
the index farm hiring day laborers had at a greater than 3-fold
increase in risk compared to farms in the integrator group that did
not hire day laborers.
Hiring intermittent part-time workers contributed to marginal
to small increases in risk for farms within the same integrator
group as the index farm, with relative risk ranging from 1.0 to 1.7
under varying parameters. This practice contributed to higher
relative risk of exposure for farms that were not in the same
integrator group as the index farm, with a greater than 4-fold
increase in risk observed in one scenario [RR:4.2 (3.4, 4.7]. By 15
days of infectiousness at the index farm, the practice of hiring
intermittent workers did not contribute significantly to elevated
risk compared to farms that did not hire these workers regardless
of integrator affiliation due to visits by other service personnel
during this longer time period.
The percent contribution to overall risk by each source of
vehicular contact was also estimated (Table 6). With 2 days of
index farm infectiousness and 2 days of viral survival on a vehicle,
sources of contact from within the integrator group accounted for
nearly 85% of total exposure risk for farms within the group. Non-
integrator commercial visits contributed approximately 4% of total
exposure risk, and part-time workers contributed 11% of total risk.
Social visits among growers accounted for less than 1% of total
risk. With a longer period of infectiousness of the index farm and a
vehicle, the relative contribution of the integrator group is
reduced, with the non-integrator sources accounting for more
than 17% of exposure risk. The contribution of part-time workers
and social visits to total risk decreased minimally with this change
in assumptions.
At 2 days of farm infectiousness and viral survival on a vehicle,
feed delivery visits are the predominant source of risk of exposure,
accounting for nearly 74% of total risk for farms within the same
integrator group as the index farm, followed by the part-time
workers and flock supervisors, which contributed approximately
11% and 7% respectively to total risk. The other sources of contact
contributed minimally to total exposure risk during a short
duration of infectiousness and viral survival. At 15 days of farm
infectiousness and 7 days of vehicle infectiousness, additional
sources contribute more significantly to overall risk and the role of
feed delivery is reduced. Feed delivery and flock supervisor visits
still play a prominent role in risk, contributing more than 50% of
risk together, but other sources–including chick delivery, part-time
workers, propane delivery and live haul–contribute together more
than 40% of total exposure risk for these farms.
Discussion
Our analysis indicates that company affiliation is a major driver
of farm-based exposure risk to an infection like avian influenza in
region with high-density food animal production. Farms within the
same integrator group as the index farm may face as much as a 5-
fold increase in exposure risk compared to farms affiliated with a
different integrator.
This ‘‘integrator effect’’ is stronger for short duration of
infectiousness and for short periods of viral survival on vehicles,
due to the high farm contact rate with integrator-linked services,
Table 3. Estimated exposure risks for second farm, given one infectious farm in region.
Point estimates for risk of exposure (%) for a second farm given a single infectious farm in the region (95% confidence
interval)
2 days of viral survival on service vehicle 7 days of viral survival on service vehicle
Number of
infectious days
at index farm
Shared integrator
affiliation with as
index farm
Different
integrator
Shared integrator
affiliation with as
index farm
Different
integrator
2 days 3.6% (2.4–4.9) 0.75% (0.3 - 1.0) 6.4% (4.2–8.6) 1.4% (0.93–2.1)
5 days 7.1 (3.6–11.5) 1.8 (1.5–2.0) 13.6 (8.1–19.4) 3.2 (2.1–5.0)
10 days 10.1 (6.8–14.5) 3.2 (2.6–4.3) 21.6 (15.6–27.8) 6.0 (3.9–9.7)
15 days 11.8 (8.3–16.2) 4.4 (3.6–6.0) 25.3 (18.7–32.3) 8.5 (5.5–14.0)
*These probabilities include integrator-linked service visits, visits from non-integrator commercial services, part-time workers and social contacts among growers.
Confidence intervals generated through nonparametric bootstrapping resampling in Crystal Ball.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t003
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of farm contact associated with the integrator group contributed
from 72–85% of total exposure risk, depending on scenario.
Hiring part-time poultry house workers was also observed to be
a significant risk factor for exposure, particularly the practice of
employing day laborers (who were assumed to move randomly
among farms that engaged in this practice). Intermittent workers
(who worked at set multiple farms on a regular schedule) also
contributed to increases in exposure risk for farms that hire these
workers, but the relative risks associated with this practice were
significantly less than those associated with hiring day laborers.
Social contacts among growers do not appear to drive exposure
risk in our model, accounting for 1% or less of total contribution to
risk.
Our results indicate that a single infectious farm within the
context of a dense, broiler producing region can result in
Figure 2. Exposure risk by duration of infectiousness and viral survival on vehicle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.g002
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business contacts. In a real-world setting, where it may take up to 2
weeks to detect an LPAI outbreak in an industrial flock and a virus
can persist for long periods of time in manure [42,46,47], farms
associated with the same integrator as the index farm may face a
25% risk of exposure to a vehicle that had serviced the index farm
during its period of infectiousness. Farms affiliated with different
integrators may have an exposure risk upwards of 8%. While the
point estimates should not be taken as interpretations of precise
risk, they suggest that the risk posed by vehicular business contacts
is a potentially significant source of viral transmission in a poultry-
dense region.
These results suggest that attention to the economic structure of
the poultry industry, specifically integrator-level groups and
business practices, may be critically important in estimating the
risk of outbreak in areas dominated by industrial-scale animal
production. Given the geographic consolidation of the industrial
food animal industry–especially in the US, where the industry is
highly concentrated in a few regions–models that estimate risk in
these regions must specifically consider factors unique to business
connections and practices in this industry. Geospatial models that
focus solely on distance among farms as the primary risk factor for
disease transmission may not capture the full dynamics of disease
spread in settings where production is dominated by a vertically
integrated structure and industrial food animal production
methods.
Correlation analyses found that certain contact rates were
significantly and positively associated with farm size as measured
by total bird capacity. Correlations were observed between total
bird capacity and flock supervisor visits, feed delivery and non-
integrator commercial visits. As these variables were important
predictors of risk in our model, these correlations suggest that total
bird capacity may be a useful proxy for risk. However, correlations
were not observed using other measures of farm size (physical size
of poultry house, number of growing cycles per year, and total
number of houses on the property). A similar study conducted in
Georgia did not find a correlation between farm size and rate of
visits; more research is required in this area to better inform
modeling efforts [48].
The coefficient of variation estimates suggest that the rates of
visits from management personnel other than the flock supervisor,
maintenance/repair services and part-time workers have the
highest relative variability of all sources of contact considered in
the model. These results suggest that the greatest need for more
information lies in these areas, and that future studies considering
contact patterns among poultry farms should pay particular
attention to these sources of contact. Low variability in cake out
visits, flock supervisor visits, chick delivery, live haul and propane
suggest more consistency in these values among farms.
Our results are supported by findings from other studies that
have reported that human movement and equipment sharing
among poultry farms is an important factor in the spread of AI
viruses [15,16,17,49]. Our results are also largely in concordance
Table 5. Relative risk of exposure for farms that hire part-time workers (95% confidence interval)*.
2 day viral survival on a service vehicle
Same integrator group as index farm Different integrator group
Days of infectiousness
at index farm
Day laborer
scenario
Intermittent
worker scenario
Day laborer
scenario
Intermittent
worker scenario
2 days 3.8 (3.0, 5.2) 1.7 (1.5, 2.0) 14.7 (11.4, 17.0) 4.2 (3.4, 4.7)
5 days 4.5 (2.8, 6.8) 1.3 (1.1, 1.4) 14.5 (11.1, 17.0) 2.0 (1.7, 2.2)
10 days 4.9 (3.5, 6.7) 1.1 (1.1, 1.1) 13.9 (10.4, 16.6) 1.3 (1.2, 1.3)
15 days 5.4 (3.9, 7.1) 1.0 (1.0, 1.0) 13.4 (9.8, 16.2) 1.0 (1.0, 1.1)
7 day viral survival on a service vehicle
Same integrator group as index farm Different integrator group
Days of infectiousness
at index farm
Day laborer
scenario
Intermittent
worker scenario
Day laborer
scenario
Intermittent
worker scenario
2 days 5.9 (4.4, 8.2) 1.4 (1.3, 1.5) 25.8 (15.9, 35.2) 2.8 (2.1, 3.5)
5 days 5.3 (3.6, 8.0) 1.1 (1.1, 1.2) 21.2 (12.6, 29.4) 1.6 (1.3, 1.8)
10 days 4.2 (3.2, 4.6) 1.0 (1.0, 1.0) 15.5 (9.0, 22.0) 1.1 (1.1, 1.2)
15 days 3.9 (3.0, 5.1) 1.0 (1.0, 1.0) 12.1 (6.9, 17.4) 1.0 (1.0, 1.0)
*Reference group is farms who do not hire part-time workers with the same model parameters (viral survival on a service vehicle, days of infectiousness, and integrator
affiliation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t005
Table 4. Relative risk of exposure, by integrator group.
Relative risk of exposure for farms within the same
integrator group as the index farm (95% CI)*
Number of
infectious days
at index farm
2 days of viral
survival on a
service vehicle
7 days of viral
survival on a
service vehicle
2 days 4.9 (3.1, 6.8) 4.9 (3.0, 7.4)
5 days 4.1 (2.2, 6.8) 4.5 (2.5, 7.1)
10 days 3.2 (2.1, 4.7) 3.8 (2.4, 5.6)
15 days 2.7 (1.9, 3.8) 3.1 (2.1, 4.5)
*Reference population is a farm that is not affiliated with the integrator group
of the index farm at the same model parameters (viral survival and duration of
infectiousness). Confidence intervals obtained using nonparametric
bootstrapping resampling in Crystal Ball.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t004
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growers in Georgia, US [48].
As any stochastic model consists of a simplified representation of
reality, we made a number of key assumptions in our analysis. For
example, we did not include environmental sources of transmis-
sion (wild animal movement, or wind or water transport, for
example) or viral emissions in our model. A growing literature
supports the notion that confined animal facilities pose biosecurity
risks, and that pathogen movement can occur through high
throughput ventilations systems, water emissions, insect and
rodent movement, and waste management practices, among other
mechanisms [50–54]. While difficult to quantify, these emissions
are undoubtedly important in transmission and our model likely
underestimates true exposure risk by excluding them.
We did not weigh contacts by level of risk, making the
assumption that all business-related or grower social contacts to
the farm pose an equal level of risk of pathogen transmission.
Further studies aimed at weighing risk of various contacts would
be valuable in this regard. Our study did not incorporate possible
differences in biosecurity practices by farmers, integrators and
businesses, which may be important mediating factors in a true
outbreak situation. Our model also does not include information
on contacts within the poultry industry involving other products
(layer chickens, turkeys, ducks, etc) or contacts between these
industries. Future projects could consider area where there is
overlap by poultry industries, such as North Carolina, to better
estimate risk in these regions.
A central limitation of this study is the small sample size of our
survey from which our estimates were generated for modeling
purposes. Our use of Monte Carlo analysis was geared towards
providing variance measures on these estimates. It is feasible that
our sample population is biased, and that growers with access to
the internet or who participate on email listserves may be
fundamentally different than growers who do not. The demo-
graphics of our respondents coincide with overall industry
demographics and observations from the Vieira et al. study
however, suggesting this concern is less germane [6,48].
As previously noted, this study focuses on risk of exposure,
rather than infection. Infection involves multiple factors, including
viral adaptation to the host species [55], dose [39,56], route of
exposure [57] and viral survival in different environments [58,59]
among other factors. There is inherent variability and uncertainty
in estimating risk of infection, particularly from novel viruses.
Modeling exposure risk can help target interventions, but
predictions of infection transmission require knowledge of viral
and host parameters. We made the choice in this model to focus
on exposure risk rather than infection risk due to our prevailing
interest in exploring the role of company affiliation in risk and
using our survey data to estimate this risk. Limiting the current
model to exposure allowed us to highlight this area of interest
while avoiding uncertainties involved in modeling the full course of
an infectious disease in a farm population. It would be expected
that risk of actual infection would be less than the exposure risk
estimates we calculate, under the assumption that not every
exposure results in infection.
Our study was intended to be a caricature of a poultry dense
region and inform general assessments of exposure risk and high-
risk practices, rather than a definitive depiction of exposure risk.
Our intention was to provide an initial exercise into infectious
disease modeling for AI transmission in the context of US broiler
farms, and in doing so, we hope to encourage additional data
collection and research in this area of relevance to industrial scale
food animal production, which is increasingly practiced around
the world. Our analysis could be performed with data from other
areas or industries to identify practices of high risk and target
interventions, and could be used as the basis for models that
consider the full course of an outbreak.
Policy implications
Business contacts are cyclical and reliable sources of potential
pathogen transmission, and as such, can be controlled through
guidelines or regulations. The integrator group is the locus of risk
of exposure from vehicular traffic, and therefore, heightened
attention should focus on improving and maintaining biosecure
practices for integrator vehicles. Regular disinfection of these
vehicles or reducing the frequency of services may be more
straightforward and efficient than targeting other sources of
potential transmission, such as confinement house emissions or
wild animal movement.
In addition to large trucks or service vehicles, this study suggests
that passenger cars–such as those driven by flock supervisors and
workers–may play a significant role in exposure risk, and it is
important to include them in biosecurity and biocontainment
plans.
The practice of hiring part-time workers in the poultry industry
should also be considered in analyses of biosecurity and
biocontainment. Integrators and growers engaging in these
practices should take care to disinfect personal vehicles and
provide protective equipment to growers for use by workers–
particularly work clothing that can be laundered at an appropriate
facility, rather than at home (the latter of which is commonplace in
the industry) [60].
Our analysis of social contact among growers suggests that
exposure risk from social contact is low. Therefore, the social
Table 6. Percent contribution to total exposure risk, by
source of contact.
Contribution to total exposure risk (%)
2 days of farm
infectiousness,
2 days of vehicle
infectiousness
15 days of farm
infectiousness,
7 days of vehicle
infectiousness
Integrator-linked contacts
Feed delivery 73.7 32.7
Flock supervisor 6.83 19.1
Chick delivery 2.3 10.9
Other management personnel 0.0 0.0
Live haul 1.9 9.1
Total 84.7 71.8
Non-integrator commercial
services
Meter reading 1.1 5.0
Propane delivery 2.2 10.3
Maintenance 0.0 0.0
Cake out 0.2 0.8
Waste haul 0.2 1.1
Total, non-integrator
commercial services
3.7 17.2
Part-time workers 10.9 10.4
Grower social contacts 0.8 0.7
Total, all sources 100.0 100.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009888.t006
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impact in reducing transmission of the virus. However, the rate of
social contacts between growers in our study was notably less than
that observed by Vieira et al. in Georgia, and further research is
required to elucidate social contact patterns among grower
populations in different regions [48].
Interventions focused on halting business related vehicular
contact within the integrator group of the infected farm and
quarantining the group, without regard to distance between farms,
would improve biosecurity and biocontainment efforts in areas
with high density animal production. Control strategies targeted
specifically at banning waste hauling services within a radius
around an infected farm, as was mandated by the US state of
Virginia in 2007 following an LPAI detection, may not
significantly reduce the risk of outbreak because of the infrequency
of this activity. Attention to the frequency of visits by different
services when designing biosecurity and biocontainment strategies
would likely improve the efficacy of these efforts.
The effect of shared integrator group was a stronger driver or
risk in our model, emphasizing the need for data on industry
associations in addition to other parameters in future modeling
exercises in industrialized regions. Modeling efforts focused on
between-farm pathogen transmission in the context of industrial
food animal production should explicitly include data on
integrator groups, rather than just spatial factors. As the industrial
model of food animal production spreads throughout the world
and expands to other food animal industries (notably swine),
attention to the specific practices in this industry is imperative to
the successful control of zoonotic disease.
Company affiliation may serve as a disease transmission
network for poultry facilities, particularly those located in high-
density production regions in the US. Knowledge of basic industry
dynamics can help identify risk profiles for these areas.
Standardized collection and greater availability of this data in
the US is essential to preventing AI outbreaks in commercial
poultry flocks and subsequent human transmission; keeping this
data confidential undermines animal and human health goals.
Existing data on LPAI outbreaks should be centralized and
publicized–including information on specific integrators involved
in outbreaks–to aid in prevention efforts.
Supporting Information
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equations.
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